This article applies Hilary Putnam's theory of internal realism to the issue of religious plurality.
Why does Putnam refer to this view as "internal realism"? Because it holds that the question "What objects does the world consist of?" is only intelligible within a conceptual scheme. 10 Moreover, not only is it the case that the objects which the world is thought to contain differ according to which scheme is employed, 11 but also what is true of those objects equally depends upon the particular conceptual scheme. Hence, "truth" does not consist in correspondence to some pre-given objects, for the objects that are deemed to exist are, in some sense, conceptual-scheme dependent. Rather, "truth" is to be understood as "idealized rational acceptability" 12 -that is, "some sort of ideal coherence of our beliefs with each other and with our experiences as those experiences are themselves represented in our belief system".
13
Note that truth is not simply rational acceptability-that is, that what is true is not reducible to what it is rationally acceptable to believe at any given time. Putnam's argument for rejecting any such identification is that truth, while being a property of certain statements, is supposed to be one that cannot be lost; whereas justification may be forfeited. (For example, the acquisition of further information might render it no longer rational to accept a claim that one was formerly rational in accepting.) Therefore, truth and justification cannot be identical. 14 So, a commitment to the characterization of truth as a property which cannot be lost by any statement that possesses it is enough by itself to avoid the conflation of truth and rational acceptability. Thus, while rejecting traditional versions of realism, Putnam's theory Putnam, "When 'Evidence Transcendence' is not Malign: A Reply to Crispin Wright", The Journal of Philosophy XCVIII, 11 (2001) : 594-600. 13 Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, op. cit., pp. 49f.
14 See ibid. In so arguing, Putnam is distancing his internal realism from Dummett's anti-realism. Dummett
reduces truth to what one is warranted in asserting. But if "truth" is equated with "warranted assertibility", then because there are some claims that one is neither warranted in asserting nor warranted in denying, they are neither true nor false. This constitutes the basis of semantic anti-realism. See, for example, Dummett, "The Reality of the Past", op. cit.
nevertheless claims to reserve the right to be viewed as a variety of realism, because it retains the distinction between truth and justification. And the hallmark of realism is often held to be precisely a distinction between truth and justification, or, conversely, the hallmark of antirealism is often held to be the reduction of truth to justification.
15
But while Putnam is a realist in distinguishing between truth and justification, he nevertheless rejects the view that truth is somehow independent of all conceptual schemes or that it is tied to one, and only one, conceptual scheme-the supposedly correct one. How, then, is the distinction between truth and rational acceptability to be maintained within any conceptual scheme? As we have noted, the distinction is to be maintained by regarding truth as an idealization of rational acceptability. In other words, truth is to be viewed as inhabiting epistemically ideal conditions, of which, unfortunately, there are none. 16 Even though this might suggest that truth is unattainable, the idealization theory of truth incorporates two key features that enable us to make truth-claims. The first is that truth is independent of justification here and now, but not, in principle, independent of all justification. Rather, to
claim that a statement is true is to claim that it could, in principle if not in fact, be justified. as lived and practiced. Suffice it to say that a subscriber to internalist pluralism is not committed to regarding "religious conceptual schemes" and "religions" as synonymous.
27 Note: I do not say "the" Christian conceptual scheme, for it cannot simply be presumed that all Christians, merely because they all refer to themselves by the same name, share the same conceptual scheme. The same can be said of all major religions.
28 What constitutes genuinely entering into a belief system? One is not compelled to become an advocate of "the Polish Logician's" conceptual scheme in order to understand his claims. Hence, internalist pluralism is not committed to the claim that one must become an adherent of a particular religious belief system before one can understand it. One might achieve a sympathetic understanding of a belief system by, for example, studying its intellectual components, familiarizing oneself with relevant ethnological research, talking to people who subscribe to it, and reading accounts of their experiences, etc. Autobiographies are especially useful for inducting an "outsider" into the thought-worlds of their authors. It would be difficult to read, for example, Sun 29 However, it is also possible for there to be a genuine disagreement. See note 40, below. I am merely pointing out that not all seeming disagreements may actually be substantive.
that world contains seven objects (for it also contains three pairs and a trio, which the Polish Logician counts as objects), then the statement is no less objectively true. In other words, given three atoms, it is objectively true that there are only three objects within a "Carnapian world" and it is equally objectively true that there are seven objects within a "Polish world".
30
Thus, when one turns to consider religious plurality, any particular faith-stance could come with its own set of objective truths that are non-commensurate with those of other belief systems.
31
Equally, internalist pluralism is not simply a version of religious subjectivism, where "truths" are demoted to whatever the believer takes them to be. For internalist pluralism is no more a form of mere subjectivism than is internal realism. Given a world comprising three atoms and their aggregates, "the Polish Logician" is objectively wrong if he thinks that there are ten objects, just as "the Carnapian" is objectively wrong if, given a world comprising three atoms, she thinks that there are only two. While the number of objects in the world is conceptual-scheme dependent, that number is not a matter of subjective taste. One can easily get the number wrong. Furthermore, getting the number wrong is not simply a case of disagreeing with those who share one's conceptual scheme. What counts as an object is conceptual-scheme dependent. But once a conceptual scheme has determined what is to count 30 C.f. Paul Boghossian, who, notwithstanding his strong inclination towards a form of metaphysical realism, nevertheless writes: "our choice of one conceptual scheme rather than another…probably reflects various contingent facts about our capacities and limitations, so that a thinker with different capacities and limitations, a
Martian for example, might find it natural to employ a different conceptual scheme. This does nothing to show that our conceptual scheme is incapable of expressing objective truths. Realism is not committed to there being only one vocabulary in which objective truths might be expressed; all it's committed to is the weaker claim that, once a vocabulary is specified, it will then be an objective matter whether or not assertions couched in that vocabulary are true of false". Paul Boghossian, "What the Sokal Hoax Ought to Teach Us: The Pernicious Consequences and Internal Contradictions of 'Postmodernist' Relativism", Times Literary Supplement, December 13, 1996: 15.
31 Moreover, once a conceptual scheme is established, it is likely to have a formative effect upon the experience of those who subscribe to it. Thus, those who subscribe to a conceptual scheme in which the Virgin Mary is taken to be an important figure are more likely to interpret an experience, if it is veridical, as "an experience of the Virgin Mary" than are those for whom Kali is more important. Subscription to a particular religious conceptual scheme, then, will incline a person to experience the "objects" recognized within that scheme, if those objects are there to be perceived within it-just as "the Polish Logician" will be more sensitive to perceiving aggregates. This is not to claim, however, that one's conceptual scheme fully determines the objects that one will experience. It is interesting to note that Hick defends a not-too-dissimilar characterization of the relationship between our beliefs and our experience in Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, op. cit.
as an object, then if there are any objects, the objects are there to be counted. xi. 33 Although it is a logical possibility, it seems most unlikely that a long-lived religious conceptual scheme (such as the conceptual schemes of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, etc.) would contain only false claims. Within a conceptual scheme the interaction of belief and experience would seem to stack the odds against that scheme being entirely constituted by false beliefs.
Side-stepping the major problems in Hick's theory
In order to indicate some of the advantages in adopting the perspective of internalist pluralism, allow me to indicate briefly how it avoids the seven major problems that currently beset the Hickean theory of religious pluralism, and which, notwithstanding the latter's sensitivity to cultural diversity, invite a paradigm shift away from it. In what follows, I refer to Hick's theory of religious pluralism as "transcendental pluralism" in order to distinguish it from internalist pluralism.
One problem with Hickean transcendental pluralism is that, in separating religious phenomena from their supposedly noumenal source, Hick is compelled to describe religions as other than their adherents take them to be. 35 In particular, he insists that the "gods" which religious believers worship are not the real thing. While this does not place one religion above any other, it nevertheless appears to imply that all believers are to some extent mistaken in their beliefs.
Internalist pluralism allows religious beliefs to be taken much more seriously. It considers them in their own terms, and does not necessarily demand a re-description of anything that believers would typically say about their religious belief system. Internalist pluralism may thus leave the claims of religious believers exactly as it finds them. For example, a subscriber to internalist pluralism need have no difficulty in accepting both that, within a Christian conceptual scheme, "Jesus is the Son of God" is a true claim, and that, within a Muslim conceptual scheme, it is false-if, that is, in both conceptual schemes there is a God to be counted. Unlike the transcendental pluralist, an adherent of internalist pluralism is not, for example, compelled to propose a revisionist account of the divinity of Christ.
A second problem with transcendental pluralism is that, in applying the Kantian phenomena/noumena distinction to religion, Hick appears to have made it impossible to talk meaningfully of revelation. Claims about the divine communicating knowledge about itself to humans abound in the world's religious traditions. Hick cannot take such claims seriously as, according to his theory, the religious noumenon is in principle unknowable.
experience-a process that might take many years. It thus seems indefensible simply to assume that those who lack that particular experience have an adequate understanding of the concept "nirvana". Consequently, it seems indefensible simply to assume that "nirvana" and "salvation" are co-extensive.
Internalist pluralism involves no such implausible claims. It acknowledges that the meaning of the core concepts of a religion is only accessible within that religious belief system. Nor does a subscriber to internalist pluralism have to claim that all religions share the same goal. For an adherent of internalist pluralism will claim that the "object" which constitutes any religious goal will, in part, 41 be dependent upon the faith-stance of those seeking to attain that goal, and that different faith-stances identify different "objects". Thus, there is no need to ignore or misdescribe the diverse data offered by the various world religions.
A seventh problem with transcendental pluralism is that Hick seems driven to offer a highly implausible account of morally motivated atheists. To cut a long story short, he ends up characterizing them as, in effect, anonymous theists who are best viewed as responding to "the Real" (which, as we have noted, is how he refers to the mooted noumenal reality lying behind religious experience). Yet surely this is susceptible to the same criticism that Hick himself has leveled against Karl Rahner's theory of the "anonymous Christian", 42 namely that it is both patronizing to the atheist and lacking in epistemic justification.
43
Interestingly, the existence of morally motivated atheists seems to provide further grounds for subscribing to an internal realist theory of pluralism in preference to Hick's Kantian variety. For there is nothing preventing internalist pluralism from taking the beliefs of all morally motivated individuals equally seriously, whether their belief systems are religious or secular. And this is because, in contradistinction to metaphysical realism, internal realism does not presume that some noumenon, never mind that the same noumenon, must ultimately 41 I say "in part" here because there is a sense in which objects are conceptual-scheme dependent and a sense in which they are, what we might inadequately call, "world-dependent". That a world comprising three atoms only contains three objects depends upon one's employing the Carnapian's conceptual scheme as opposed to the Polish Logician's. But there is also a sense in which the fact that there are only three objects does not. For it equally depends on there not being four or more atoms.
lie behind all moral and religious phenomena.
Defending internalist pluralism
Despite such appealing features of internalist pluralism, ultimately its acceptability would seem to depend upon the plausibility of internal realism. Perhaps the most vigorous and influential critic of internal realism is William Alston. If Alston has succeeded in his critique of internal realism, then advocating internalist pluralism would seem pointless. So, in this final section I shall defend internalist pluralism by responding to, what I take to be, Alston's principal objection to internal realism.
Alston's main charge would appear to be that internal realism is internally incoherent because, he claims, its account of conceptual schemes generates a vicious, infinite regress.
Alston concludes that in order to be intelligible, a conceptual scheme will require a metaconceptual scheme which will in turn require a meta-meta-conceptual scheme, and so on ad infinitum. 44 He argues that this vicious regress is a consequence of internal realism's insistence that all objects are conceptual-scheme dependent. For once the conceptual-scheme dependence of objects is accepted, the objection goes, one is committed to the metaconceptual-scheme dependence of conceptual schemes because the latter are no less objects.
45
But, in response, while it is true that, according to internal realism, one cannot conceive of objects existing outside of all conceptual schemes, and while it might well appear to follow that one cannot conceive of conceptual schemes existing outside of a meta-conceptual scheme that allows one to view conceptual schemes as objects, a person can, nevertheless, conceive of objects as existing, given her conceptual scheme, without possessing any conception of a conceptual scheme as itself an object. Meta-conceptual schemes are tools of higher level 45 Furthermore, according to Alston, internal realism is committed to two claims that together give rise to a petitio principii. First, all objects are dependent upon some conceptual scheme. Second, conceptual schemes are dependent upon human minds. But these two claims entail, in Alston view, both that conceptual schemes are dependent upon human minds, and that human minds are objects conceived within conceptual schemes and hence are dependent upon them, which seems circular. Ibid., p. 33. But the internal realist can easily respond that the "dependence" is not of the same sort, and hence the objection rests upon an equivocation. Conceptual schemes are dependent upon human minds in the sense that human minds create conceptual schemes. But the internal realist does not hold that conceptual schemes create minds. Rather, conceptual schemes determine what "the human mind" means.
interpretation; they do not identify the objects within an everyday world. And whereas, according to internal realism, one needs a conceptual scheme if one is to identify what exists within a world, that world can be adequately comprehended without a meta-conceptual scheme identifying as an object the conceptual scheme that identifies the objects within the everyday world. Putting the point another way, one certainly needs a language for statements within that language to make sense. And one might well require a meta-language if one is to talk about language without generating self-referential paradoxes. But one does not need a meta-language in order for everyday statements within a language to be comprehensible.
Similarly, one is not driven to a dependence upon some meta-conceptual scheme for objects to be identified by a conceptual scheme. Put yet another way, if statements can makes sense within a language, as they clearly can, even if talking about a language without generating problems of self-referentiality requires a meta-language, then conceptual schemes can successfully identify objects within those schemes even if a meta-conceptual scheme is required in order to identify a conceptual scheme as an object.
In a word, then, the conceptual-scheme dependence of objects no more generates an infinite regress than does the language-dependence of sentences. And if, contrary to fact, the language-dependence of sentences generated an infinite regress such that statements in a language could not make sense without the language making sense within a meta-language, and so on ad infinitum, then no statement would make sense. But then, any assumption that an infinite regress is entailed by the language dependence of statements would consist of a statement that only made sense given a language that only made sense given a meta-language, and so on, which would itself entail that any such statement was meaningless, given the obvious fact that statements clearly are language dependent. In other words, no such critique can be stated without its entailing that the critique is meaningless. And if this constitutes a reductio ad absurdum of the denial that statements are language dependent, then, given the parallels between language dependence and conceptual-scheme dependence, Alston's critique of internal pluralism must surely be unsound.
A more interesting variation on Alston's objection would be to argue that an infinite regress of conceptual schemes is generated by the need to posit a meta-conceptual scheme in order to explain how individuals can switch between conceptual schemes. The objector might hold that, for example, in order to explain how someone could move from a Christian conceptual scheme to a Muslim one, and back again, the internal realist would need to posit a meta-conceptual scheme that could be employed to "translate" the Christian conceptual scheme into the Muslim one, and vice versa. However, in response, it would seem that if one had been able to immerse oneself fully both in a Christian and in a Muslim way of life, then one could easily move from a Christian conceptual scheme to a Muslim conceptual scheme and back again, without the need for a meta-conceptual scheme in order to do so. For just as one can easily move from "It's raining" to "Il pleut", and back again, without the need for either a linguistic or a meta-linguistic theory, then, analogously, one does not require a metaconceptual scheme in order to switch from one conceptual scheme to another.
However, if one does want to understand how Christian and Muslim conceptual schemes fit together into a wider theoretical picture, then one does require a meta-conceptual scheme, such as internalist pluralism, in order to do so. But then, what about an alternative metaconceptual scheme? If one fully understood both that alternative-Hickean transcendental pluralism, say-and internalist pluralism, one could move from one meta-conceptual scheme to another without the need for an even higher level theory. Hence, because one can operate within any such theoretical system without a higher theoretical system being necessary, no infinite regress is generated.
One advantage of positing the theory of internalist pluralism as a meta-conceptual scheme is that it enables two conceptual schemes to be taken equally seriously. A danger of those within one conceptual scheme thinking about another conceptual scheme is that they may well think about it solely in terms of their own conceptual scheme, which, in effect, is to reduce the other conceptual scheme to a poorly understood subset of their own worldview. A multicultural world surely requires avoiding the kinds of misunderstandings that such an attitude can give rise to. Hence, if Christians and Muslims, for example, are to begin to understand each other adequately, internalist pluralism provides a useful meta-conceptual scheme for so doing.
But it might then be objected that adherents of internalist pluralism run the danger of failing fully to understand alternative meta-conceptual schemes. So, isn't a meta-metaconceptual scheme required? It seems to me that adherents of different meta-conceptual schemes very often fail to understand each other adequately. Realists and anti-realists, for example, often seem to talk past each other, and it may well be advantageous to seek a metameta-conceptual scheme in order to avoid misunderstandings at the level of meta-conceptual schemes. But in order to understand how two conceptual schemes relate, it is not necessary to posit a meta-meta-conceptual scheme. One only requires a meta-conceptual scheme. Hence, no vicious, infinite regress is generated.
In short, to understand how the things in a world relate together, one requires a conceptual scheme; and to understand how conceptual schemes relate together, one requires a meta-conceptual scheme. To understand how meta-conceptual schemes relate together, one would require a meta-meta-conceptual scheme. But a conceptual scheme does not require a metaconceptual scheme for it to work. Only if, in order to understand how things relate in a world, one required a conceptual scheme, which itself required a meta-conceptual scheme, which likewise required a meta-meta-conceptual scheme, and so on ad infinitum, would an infinite regress be generated. So, in order to understand another conceptual scheme fully, it would, admittedly, be advantageous to go to a higher theoretical level. But one does not require a higher theoretical level in order to understand the objects within one's own conceptual scheme. Now, one might gain a higher understanding of one's own conceptual schemeespecially of its limitations-by going to a higher level. But that is not required for one's scheme to be workable. And only if the theory of internalist pluralism advocated here made a conceptual scheme unworkable without going to a higher level would the theory be susceptible to Alston's critique.
Conclusion
I have argued that internalist pluralism takes all religious beliefs much more seriously than do other approaches to the problems posed by religious plurality. And it does so by discarding any notion of the religious noumenon. It requires nothing that is transcendent to whichever religious conceptual scheme is in question. 46 It is in a position to acknowledge the genuine differences between religious traditions because it is able to accept that some statements might be true within one faith-stance even while being false within another. Indeed, internalist pluralism goes so far as to accept that religious statements may be objectively true within the relevant faith-stance. Moreover, the religious phenomena of all traditions are given prima facie equal weighting, and none need be re-described in a manner that brings them closer to other traditions. Nor does internalist pluralism have any need to re-describe the core concepts or the goals of any religious tradition. Finally, internalist pluralism has no difficulty in regarding the conceptual schemes of atheists as being on a par with those of religious believers, nor is it compelled to re-describe or put in question atheistic moral motivation. It seems to me that these constitute considerable advantages over other approaches to the plurality of religious and secular belief systems.
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In conclusion, then, internalist pluralism succeeds in accounting for the considerable differences between the various world religions, while remaining sensitive to cultural diversity, and while also managing to avoid the pitfalls in John Hick's transcendental religious pluralism. All of this suggests that internalist pluralism constitutes a superior paradigm.
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